In previous blog posts, I’ve discussed: (1) Japan’s economic problems; (2) the problems of the western European banks (e.g. in the UK, Germany, Sweden, and Switzerland); (3) the more serious economic problems of the PIIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain); and, (4) and Latvia, which I am using as the “canary in the coal mine”. Latvia is representative of the Eastern European countries, in which the Western European banks lent a lot of money – their equivalent of subprime loans. In this entry, I am going to do an update of Latvia, and then some new data on European banks.
Latvia. For background read a previous blog post, Economy: Latvia, the Declawing of a Baltic Tiger, or make do with just this summary (taken from the FT article, What went wrong with Latvia?):
“This is how a country can blow a bubble that will definitely burst: 1) Run high inflation; 2) Borrow profusely; 3) Import much more than it exports; 4) Build an economy on speculation in assets; 5) Put no public funds aside for a rainy day; 6) Meanwhile, peg its currency to a stable currency. Latvia ticked every box.”
For the 1-year period ending 1Q2009, Latvian house prices declined by 36% (vs. ~17% for the USA). Many of the mortgages are denominated in Euros (vs. the Lat, the Latvian currency). The EU has committed to helping Latvia with an economic stabilization loans. The IMF as well. But in return the Latvian government has had to slash its budget, which causes layoffs and salary cuts, and deepens their recession.
In 2008, Latvia’s GDP declined by 4.6%. In 2009, it is forecast to decline 18%, and 4% in 2010. From a May report, unemployment is forecast to average 13.9% in 2009, and 17.4% in 2010. But this may be optimistic, since it was 16.3% in May. Unemployment benefits run out after 12 months.
From Bloomerg this week (IMF Talks With Latvia):
The Parliament passed 500 million lati ($1 billion) in spending cuts on June 16, to unlock the loan from the European Commission. The country cut spending on state wages, pensions, and maternity support, in addition to other spending cuts to reduce this year’s budget deficit. Now, it must find a similar sum of money from either budget cuts or raising revenue in next year’s budget.
The European Commission, the biggest lender in Latvia’s 7.5 billion-euro ($10.5 billion) international stabilization program, has said it will transfer 1.2 billion euros this month to the country. The IMF delayed a 200 million-euro transfer in March and has not paid out a second tranche of the same sum. Both organizations have missions in Latvia now.
$11 Billion in Economic Stabilization loans may not seem like a lot of money. But that is about ~30% of Latvia’s GDP. The population of Latvia is just 2.2 Million people. So the loan comes down to $5,000 per person in Latvia. In other words, the EU just made the ultimate subprime loan. Will this prevent or just delay an economic catastrophe (not just in Latvia, but by ripple effects, in the other eastern European countries, then the western European banks, then Europe, then …)? I’m not smart enough to know the answer. But I will keep an eye on this “canary”?
Europe (aka, “the coal mine”). Mauldin just came out with a great note (click on Europe on the Brink for the PDF). It is a bit wonkish. So I will try to do an overly simplistic summary. Mauldin presents some data on the amount of leverage employed by an average of the largest banks within a geographic region over time. The amount of leverage that a bank uses is a key measure of the solvency of a bank. To get this, you need at least banking 101.
Banking 101. Lets suppose that I start a bank, and I invest $1M (million) dollars. I then take in deposits of $9M dollars (e.g. checking accounts, savings accounts, etc). I now have $10M dollars. I loan out $10M dollars (eg mortgages, business loans, etc). I have $10M in assets (the loans) and $1M in capital. I am employing 10 to 1 leverage. If I pay 3% per year on the deposits (3% * $9M = $270,000) and collect 5% on the loans (5% * $10M = $500,000), then when all goes well, I will make $230,000 per year – a nice return on my $1M investment. But now suppose all the loans are home mortgages, and $2M (20%) of the loans go bad, I have to foreclose, and after expenses and selling the properties, suppose I net 50% of the original loan value. I’ve lost $1M, my capital (i.e. my original $1M investment) is wiped out. The FDIC takes over. But now suppose, instead of 10X leverage, I was allowed to apply 50X leverage – i.e. only invest $200K (vs. $1M). If all goes well, I now make $206,000 per year – I’ve more than doubled my investment in just 1 year. However, if just 4% of the loans go bad and I am only able to collect 50% on the defaulted loans, I’m wiped out. And, if more that 4% of the loans go bad, the FDIC which guarantees the depositors, will also lose money.
Banking 102. Banking regulations and regulators are suppose to make sure that the banks do not take on too much risk (ie leverage). Banking regulators mainly look at Tier 1 capital ratios. The banking stress tests looked at Tangible-Capital ratios. The differences are complicated, so I will over-simplify. If a bank was liquidated tomorrow, and the various capital assets sold for what they are on the books (e.g. the bank buildings, the federal reserve deposits, treasury holdings, etc), we are talking tangible capital. But if we also include the assets that cannot be realized quickly (those that could only be realized over several years, eg tax deferred assets), we are talking Tier 1 capital.
Over the years, bank regulations have been loosened (repeal of Glass Steagall near the end of the Clinton administration), and the banks have figured out creative complex financial schemes (SIVs, conduits, etc) to get around existing regulations.
If you “groc” the above, you can now get my following summary and the graphs in Mauldin’s piece. For each geography below, I’ll give you the approximate 2004 Tier-1/Tangible-Capital ratios, and then what they are in 1Q2009.
- USA. 2004: 12/22. 1Q2009: 12/45.
- UK. 2004: 20/32. 4Q2008: 38/55.
- Eurozone. 2004: 30/38. 4Q2008: 35/55.
- Switzerland. 2001: 28/50. 2004: 40/65. 1Q2009: 45/68.
Switzerland was already getting crazy in 2004, so I also included 2001 as more of a base line. But this data is only for some of the largest banks in each geography (e.g. just 2 banks from Switzerland: UBS and Credit Suisse) – see Mauldin for the specifics. Europe’s banks invested in our subprime mortgage-backed securities, and suffered great losses. But they are now faced with the $4.5 Trillion that they have lent to various emerging-market countries, businesses, and consumers.
And, Mauldin’s piece only looks at the large European commercial banks. It doesn’t look at the slightly smaller banks, like Swedbank of Sweden which did all those loans in Latvia. It also doesn’t include the regional banks within a country (e.g. the Landesbanks in Germany, and the Building Societies in the UK) that are also in trouble.
I don’t know how the story will end. In the early 1980’s, we had the Latin American Debt Crisis. Commercial banks lent these countries billions, which they could not pay back. If the banks had valued the debt as to what it was then worth, our large commercial banks would have been insolvent. Instead, the Feds blinked, and allowed the inherent profitability of the banking model to work its magic, and they wrote down/off the loans over time.
So, perhaps, this scenario will play out the same way. Or not.